We think his Honor erred in reversing the interlocutory order upon the petition to rehear it. At the time it was entered, it was the only order to which the plaintiffs upon the allegations and prayer of their bill were entitled.— They do not pretend that they have an absolute, or, indeed, any other certain interest in the slaves in question; on the contrary, they say expressly “ that it is doubtful what estate in the said slaves they have under the bequest contained in the last will and testament of William Partin.” And they pray only to have the slaves in the possession of the defendant, and the money for which she had sold the others, secured. The flat made by the Judge, and the writ of sequestration issued upon it, were in accordance with the prayer. The plaintiffs no where set up any claim to the accruing profits of the slaves diming the life of the defendant, but on the contrary, had permitted her to enjoy them unquestioned for nearly thirty years. Had she given bond for the forthcoming of the slaves according to the proviso in the fiat, and writ of sequestration, she would undoubtedly have enjoyed their hires and profits; and we think that she was equally entitled to them, when the slaves were taken into possession, and hired out by the Sheriff. The order to that effect made by the Court was therefore, proper, and ought not to have been reversed. This opinion will be certified to the Court below, to the end, that the order to reverse the decretal order in question may itself be reversed with costs, and that the Court may proceed in the cause.
Decree accordingly.